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ABSTRACT
Do downtown revitalization efforts detrimentally affect people who are displaced?
HUD’s HOPE VI grant program provides local housing authorities with funds to leverage private
investment to demolish blighted, severely distressed public housing units and replace them with
mixed-use, mixed-income units. In 2002, the OHA secured an $18 million grant to redevelop a
public housing project then known as Carver Court. 212 units of public housing were razed and
former public housing residents were displaced to make way for redevelopment. Interviews with
55 former residents of Carver Court are analyzed to determine the self-reported effects of the
local implementation of federal housing policy. Outcomes measured include satisfaction with
occupation, housing costs, neighborhood quality, crime, social interactions, access to public
transportation, and quality of life overall, among others. In addition, the analysis uses Census
data to examine the extent to which poverty deconcentration, a major policy goal of HOPE VI,
has been accomplished. Implications of the findings are discussed in terms of HOPE VI’s
position in the history of American housing policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The mayor of Orlando, Florida, asked that his time in office be judged by what he
accomplishes in his city’s most dysfunctional neighborhood (McKay 2004, 2005). The
Parramore Historical District, once a vibrant African-American enclave, has more recently fallen
into crime and disrepair. Its unique location at the edge of the downtown Orlando (between a
major interstate and a football stadium) has often placed Parramore at the center of both crime
reduction and economic redevelopment efforts.
The Orlando area has experienced an economic boost since the opening of Walt Disney
World in 1971, and since then the local government has been optimistic about the city’s future.
But local officials like Orlando’s current mayor fear that if they do not continue to promote the
downtown and retail areas of Orlando, Walt Disney World will overtake them in retail and
business activity (Pagano and Bowman 1995).
The Downtown Development Board, charged with redeveloping Orlando’s central
business district, often purchases land it wishes to improve and uses the land as leverage to
attract investors and developers. These joint public-private ventures are expected to generate
healthy returns. In fact, because of high demand for real estate in Orlando, all investments
undertaken by the city are expected to return profit to either the city or the Downtown
Development Board (Pagano and Bowman 1995).
Urban sprawl and migration to the Orlando metropolitan area, including by tourists, have
in recent times infused large amounts of money to mitigate transportation issues and improve
infrastructure. A large portion of Orlando’s labor market is employed in the low-wage service
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industry; this fact combined with the accompanying surge in median home values has pushed
affordable housing beyond the reach of many working families (Pagano and Bowman 1995).
This research focuses on a public housing redevelopment site in Parramore. In 2002, a
run-down public housing project once known as Carver Court was demolished. An $18 million
revitalization grant provided by HUD’s HOPE VI program enabled the Orlando Housing
Authority (OHA) to leverage an additional $40 million from public and private sources. In all,
212 units of public housing where 148 families resided were demolished and are being replaced
with 203 units consisting of 57 affordable and market-rate homes for sale, a 64-unit elderly
apartment building, and 82 units of mixed-income, mixed-finance rental housing. The few
remaining public housing units are to be reserved for former Carver Court residents who wish to
return after redevelopment is complete (Orlando Housing Authority 2006). Construction is still
ongoing at the writing of this report – environmentally toxic dirt uncovered beneath the
demolished former project has delayed redevelopment while the site is cleaned up (Schlueb
2006).
This analysis augments the existing body of housing policy research by using survey data
collected from former public housing residents to analyze the general experience of relocation
under the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) HOPE VI program.
Initially, emphasis is placed on similarities and differences between respondents who relocated
to other public housing units and those who were dispersed into the private housing market. It is
expected that distinctions will arise between these two sub-groups due in part to higher expenses
in the private housing market (for example, public housing residents do not pay for utilities).
The purpose of the subsequent analysis is to evaluate HOPE VI’s effort to alleviate
concentrated urban poverty. Lessening the concentration of urban poverty has been a goal of
2

previous housing programs and policies, and HOPE VI is no exception. Comparing these earlier
findings with data on the distribution of relocated residents in Orlando will shed light on the
extent to which poverty deconcentration, a primary goal of HOPE VI, has been achieved (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2006). This goal is evaluated using block
group-level census data to compare poverty rates in the former Carver Court project and poverty
rates in the relocated households’ block groups following relocation.
Housing policy is a highly nuanced enterprise because of the complex and often
competing interactions between downtown redevelopment and providing housing for the poor.
Like other HOPE VI grants, Orlando’s used resident relocation and demolition to lessen the
concentration of poverty and reverse the effect of years of economic disinvestment and physical
deterioration. It has been suggested that the net loss of public housing units resulting from HOPE
VI redevelopments like Orlando’s spells trouble for vulnerable populations and could exacerbate
the homelessness problem. Thus, a fuller conceptualization of relocation as it occurs in the
HOPE VI program will enable policymakers, investors, and affordable housing advocates to
provide for the needs of the poor while simultaneously promoting economic sustainability at the
municipal level.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Throughout the entire 20th century and into the 21st century, the federal government has
made it its business to remove blighted structures and rebuild downtrodden neighborhoods, often
in parcels of land that are located downtown. Whether called “slum clearance,” “urban renewal,”
“urban revitalization,” or “urban redevelopment,” each of these policies requires the removal of
former residents of the distressed buildings. Policies like HOPE VI have been called any and all
of these things subject to the political semantics of the time.
The history of American housing policy has oscillated from policies that advocate
warehousing poor populations to dispersing them, depending on the social climate in which the
policy is formed. Urban redevelopment projects like HOPE VI relocate the original residents of
the blighted structures they demolish. This phenomenon, first recognized during the urban
renewal era of 1950s, is often referred to today as “displacement” in the increasingly diverse
body of housing policy literature (Van Vliet 1998).
Like other social policies, HOPE VI is the result of a confluence of historical issues and
was not simply created in a vacuum. Understanding the policy tradition from which HOPE VI
sprang provides researchers with a general framework from which the social effects of modern
housing policies might be evaluated. Indeed, redevelopment as it is implemented today in
America’s cities under the HOPE VI program cannot be adequately conceptualized without a
historical review of research and policy on housing and displacement.
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Housing Policy in the Early 20th Century
In the proceedings of the Eighth National Conference on Housing, experts from the
National Housing Association came together to discuss the state of American housing policy.
Presentations by lawyers, foremen, architects, physicians, business leaders, bankers, and
legislators enumerated the diverse housing issues of the day such as the fair rent debate and the
standardization of building materials to keep down construction costs. As an educational agency,
the National Housing Association offered advice on housing issues to about 350 different
municipalities during the years 1919 and 1920 (1920:341).
Interestingly, the National Housing Association’s conference concluded that:
“the great outstanding feature of the year has been the housing shortage. This has been not merely
national; it has been universal. Because of the War, there has been an almost universal stoppage of housing
construction all over the world” (National Housing Association 1920:319).

The foremost consequence of the shortage was an increase in rent as landlords “attempted
to charge ‘all the traffic would bear.’” They were optimistic about the extent of the consequences
of the housing shortage. While a great housing shortage existed, they stated that there were but
few cities where people “had to sleep in the streets or parks or in tents, or where the authorities
have been called upon to provide emergency accommodations” (1920:322). As we know, those
facts would change after another decade first brought economic prosperity, and then utter
economic catastrophe.
The pre-Depression-era reluctance to embrace non-market solutions to social problems
meant the government did not provide many of the services we are familiar with today. Indeed,
“the demand for government housing was on the increase due to increased rents and the lack of
housing generally, though it had not achieved serious proportions in 1920 and [was] limited to isolated
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groups or persons with a preconceived view towards socialistic and communistic undertakings. The general
public as a whole [did] not seem to be at all in favor of such an extension of governmental activities”
(National Housing Association 1920:323).

Again, hindsight tells us the conferees were terrible prognosticators. Nevertheless, the
lines of the housing policy debate were clearly drawn in the early 20th century with caustic
suggestions that government-sponsored housing is a notion entertained only by political radicals;
the private housing market could be trusted to provide decent, affordable housing for everyone in
America without resorting to such extremes.
The Depression finally forced the federal government to formulate a policy to eradicate
the burgeoning slums and provide decent housing for those who could not afford it. The United
States Housing Authority (USHA) built and managed the first public housing projects. The
projects marked a major shift in public opinion regarding government-sponsored housing.
Whereas not even a generation had passed since the 1920 national conference on housing, the
demand for public housing “due to increased rents and the lack of housing generally” had
reached such proportions by 1937 that millions of federal dollars were allocated to slum
clearance and the construction of public housing projects.
Sociologists have long sought to measure the social effects of housing policy empirically.
F. Stuart Chapin evaluated the federal government’s first public housing program, created by the
Housing Act of 1937. The Act established the USHA, which thenceforth assumed the
responsibilities of the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration. Chapin wondered
whether families who lived in Depression-era slums would be better off being relocated into a
USHA-managed public housing project. After all, he noted, “an affirmative answer to this
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question is assumed as the justification for the expenditure of millions of dollars” (Chapin,
1940:868).
Chapin’s (1940) experiment followed 44 families who were relocated from the
Minneapolis slums into public housing projects and 38 control families who remained in the
slums. The families, who were matched on ten factors, were tracked for two years and occupied
the same dwelling for both years of the study.
He found that project families experienced substantial improvements in family condition
compared to control families using such measures as crowding, social participation, social status,
and “condition of the furnishings of the living room” (Chapin 1940:868). Interestingly, he found
no significant change in morale in either group (though he attributed this to the relatively short
span of observation). Chapin’s evaluation conceded that since family conditions improved to a
much larger degree for experimental families than control families, using millions of dollars to
relocate slum families into public housing projects was justified.
Congress created the federal public housing program to provide decent housing for those
who could not afford it. To Chapin, it appeared to have worked – rounding up those vulnerable
to housing burdens and relocating them into public housing showed measurable benefits to
recipients. Periodically in the history of federal housing policy, however, the interests of public
housing residents have come in second to those advocating for downtown redevelopment.

The Urban Renewal Era
The Housing Act of 1949 marked the beginning of a new kind of housing policy in the
United States. The postwar Housing Act of 1954 that modified the 1949 act was the first to
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legislate the phrase “urban renewal.” According to Fullilove (2004), the push for progress that
characterized the 1950s was not limited to new jobs and technology, but was extended to new
types of land use. Planners also used another semantically fresh term, “blight,” which, according
to Fullilove, was “invented specifically for purposes of redoing aging downtown areas, and
meant, quite simply, that buildings had lost their sparkle and their profit margin” (Fullilove
2004:58). Further, Fullilove states that while downtown business leaders were interested in using
urban renewal and the federal highway program to remove blight, the efforts had the added effect
of removing blacks from the area.
The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act 1 (URA),
passed in 1970, declared that:
“Minimizing the adverse impact of displacement is essential to maintaining the economic and
social well-being of communities…to ensure that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as
a result of programs and projects designed for the benefit of the public as a whole and to minimize the
hardship of displacement on such persons.”

Gans foresaw the possible creation of new slums by relocating poor families into areas
which subsequently became overcrowded and rapidly deteriorated. He perceptively noted that:
“This has principally been the case with Negroes who, for both economic and racial reasons, have
been forced to double up in other ghettos. Indeed, because almost two-thirds of the cleared slum units have
been occupied by Negroes, the urban renewal program has often been characterized as Negro clearance,
and in too many cities, this has been its intent” (Gans 1973:539).

Hartman also recognized the potential for folly in “the effect of population redistribution
on the city’s ecological patterns, particularly with respect to racial segregation” (1973:293-294).

1

This document can be found at http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/compilations/relocate_.PDF.
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The downtown urban renewal policies enacted between the 1950s and 1970s created
many of the high-rise, high-density projects that later came to be stigmatized as warehouses for
the poor. Notorious projects like those erected in Chicago and St. Louis caused more social
problems than they solved. The policies chosen resulted in extreme concentrations of urban
poverty, which sought to:
“…maintain the ghetto boundaries, but accommodate newcomers…which was guaranteed to
create areas with large populations of very poor people… In general, [the projects] lack the features that
make urban slums a place to get a toehold in the nation’s economy. Thus, in the long run, housing projects
could only make the poor poorer” (Fullilove 2004:65).

Urban renewal was sometimes derisively referred to as “Negro removal.” According to
researchers like Hirsch (1983) and Massey and Denton (1993), the boundaries of the ghetto have
been continuously strengthened since the end of the Civil War in 1865. Public housing was used
in the urban renewal era to mitigate the effects of displacement due to the razing of black
neighborhoods. Many federal low-income housing projects were sited on the periphery of
existing black neighborhoods, destabilizing them. Concentrated poverty remains a feature of
many black neighborhoods in America today. The deliberate steering of blacks to clearly
demarcated enclaves reached its zenith during the urban renewal era, and was most clearly
exemplified by the high-rise public housing projects constructed during that time (Massey and
Denton 1993).
Less sensational but no less important was Rainwater’s (1966) recognition that residential
security was the most important need to be satisfied for low income families. According to him,
insecurity about one’s residence can lead to a defeatist self-conception, a reluctance to seek
employment, and a general feeling of powerlessness that hinders residents’ ability to cope with
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the social world. Low income residents must preoccupy themselves with safety, while middle
and upper class residents are free to concern themselves with amenities to enhance the comfort
and convenience of home.
The demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe projects in St. Louis in 1972 marked the beginning of
the end of the urban renewal era and the beginning of the era that eventually spawned HOPE VI.
The struggles of residents in the Pruitt-Igoe project was famously chronicled by Rainwater, who
was concerned “with private life as it is lived day to day in a federally built and supported slum”
(Rainwater 1970:1). To Rainwater, the era of urban renewal was the end of New Deal-style
social policies. He scoffed at the notion that increased affluence for some would translate into
ever-larger slices of the economic pie for all.
Defensible Space (1972) was funded by the Justice Department under the Safe Streets
Act of 1968, since it was already clear at the time that certain neighborhoods are more vulnerable
to crime than others. The Act included guidelines that stated federally-supported families with
children could not be housed in high-rise buildings. The government sought research on new
techniques in crime prevention. By the time Newman published this influential monograph on
the design pitfalls of these monolithic public housing structures, stigmatization of the projects
had already reached significant proportions.
Newman suggested four new techniques be implemented in urban design to correct the
crime problem in inner-city metropolises. First, planners must design buildings which 1) provide
a territorial feeling, meaning each tenant perceives the distinction between their private living
space and public spaces; 2) allow ample surveillance of the building’s interior and surroundings,
and particularly enable clear views to police patrols from the street; 3) eliminate the highly
recognizable, stigmatized form of public housing; and 4) are built in sensible geographic
10

locations and are not adjacent to inappropriate structures (Newman 1972:50). With the exception
of the final, vague technique regarding geographic location, Newman’s findings are largely
consistent with modern redevelopment practices.
An important question is whether evidence supports his thesis or, alternately, perhaps
high crime rates in urban areas are more a result of the social characteristics of the population.
The Defensible Space hypothesis, under closer scrutiny, would be perhaps better characterized as
“strategies to enhance the effectiveness of neighborhood watch programs in public housing,”
though Newman’s title is decidedly catchier. Despite the attractiveness of a quick fix to the
problems of urban ghettos, design-oriented solutions to public housing issues often lose sight of
tenant needs in favor of economic or administrative expediency.
Early efforts at reversing the warehousing of poor, mostly African-American residents
that grew from the Fair Housing Act of 1968 resulted in government programs that emphasized
the economic and racial desegregation of urban areas. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s (HUD) regional mobility program attempted to use Section 8 vouchers to
disperse inner-city residents into suburban sectors. The frequently changing priorities of federal
housing policy had clearly shifted once again.

The Endless Search for Policy Solutions
Clearly, the worst outcome after 65 years of federal housing policy is spatially
concentrated poverty in public housing projects. Over the years, local politicians and investors in
many urban areas sought to locate public housing projects away from affluent neighborhoods
and near poor and deteriorating inner cities (Hirsch 1983). The subsequent poverty experienced
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by blacks in the segregated inner cities of the United States only aggravated social problems
there (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). A mix of unemployment and gentrification
changed the structure of the inner city, eventually making it difficult to maintain formal and
informal institutions and ultimately increasing social isolation (Wilson 1987).
To Jencks (1992), the rise in neighborhood pathologies can be partially explained by
Wilson’s (1987) “physical isolation” hypothesis. Single parenthood, unemployment, the
deterioration of schools, and business closures can all be attributed to middle class blacks
moving out of the ghetto. These demographic shifts at the neighborhood level spell trouble for
low income blacks for whom positive role models and beneficial social networks are pathways to
self sufficiency. But Jencks points out that middle class blacks moving out of the ghetto may
have positive social effects as well. It is clear that poor blacks who remain in neighborhoods
experiencing disinvestment are worse off than the middle class blacks who move; however,
Jencks wonders whether the benefits to middle class blacks outweigh the costs to poor blacks.
Such ambiguous findings undoubtedly broaden our understanding of complex issues like
neighborhood effects, but they unfortunately do not offer the panacea policymakers often seek.
In short, proving Wilson’s intriguing (but unproven) argument about the effect of economic
segregation on inner-city blacks requires reliable results. Reliability requires replication of
research, both of which sometimes prevent funding agencies from quick and unambiguous
results. According to Jencks, this can lead research sponsors to perceive that all social science is
a waste of time and money. In conclusion, he laments the imbalance between the state of social
science funding and the demands of funding agencies (Jencks 1992).
By the early 1990s, the word “epidemic” was commonly used to describe the effects of
concentrated poverty in urban ghettos. Citing crack-cocaine epidemics, epidemics of gang
12

violence, and epidemics of teenage childbearing, Crane found the increasing news media
coverage of ghetto epidemics “to be remarkably apt” (1991:1227). He hypothesized that as
neighborhood quality decreases there should be an increase in the incidence of social problems.
Further, as neighborhood quality nears the bottom of the distribution, the epidemic theory
of ghettos postulates that there should be a sharp jump in the probability an individual will
develop pathological behavior. As measures, he used school dropouts and teen pregnancies
reported in Census microdata. He found strong support for his theory and suggested
neighborhood effects on dropouts and teen pregnancy might be even more substantial since
teenagers not living with their parents and those with inconsistencies or other problems in their
records were left out of the study (Crane 1991:1242).
Augmenting Crane’s work on neighborhood effects, Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov,
and Sealand (1993) examined whether neighborhoods influence child and adolescent
development. They studied low birth-weight children born at eight university hospitals around
the United States and studied teenage girls using PSID data. Most significantly, they found that
the presence of affluent neighbors affected childhood IQ, teenage births, and school dropouts
even after controlling for the socioeconomic characteristics of families (Brooks-Gunn et al.
1993:374).
The perception that public housing projects are hotbeds of social disorder also has a
significant social-psychological component. Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) used a multimethod approach to examine the grounds on which individuals form perceptions of
neighborhood disorder. Not surprisingly, they found that observed disorder predicts perceived
disorder.
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Less intuitive and more revealing is the finding that as the concentration of minorities
increases, perceived disorder increases in respondents of all races. They suggest that these
finding do not reflect racial prejudice, because since “blacks are no less likely than whites to be
influenced by racial composition in predicting disorder…few would contend that blacks are as
prone to anti-black racial prejudice as are whites” (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004:336). Other
research supports their findings – Quillian and Pager (2001) found a positive association between
the number of young black men in a neighborhood and the perception of neighborhood crime
level, though this association varied according to the race of the respondent. Nevertheless, even
after controlling for two measures of actual crime rates and other neighborhood characteristics,
their findings supported the view that racial stereotypes influence perceptions of neighborhood
crime levels.
While relocating former public housing residents into the private housing market via
HOPE VI, PHAs have experienced opposition from NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) groups.
These groups fear that subsidized housing sites (e.g. public housing and housing for the elderly)
located near their homes will ruin their neighborhoods. By studying deconcentration initiatives in
both Denver and Baltimore County, scholars were able to isolate the conditions which made
subsidized living undesirable in certain areas and dispel the myth that all affordable housing
detrimentally affects property values (Galster, Tatian, Santiago, Pettit, and Smith 2003).
They concluded that subsidized housing projects should not be built in neighborhoods of
low-value or in neighborhoods with high population densities. Additionally, large scale housing
projects should be avoided. If housing policymakers follow these guidelines, they contend,
opposition groups will come to appreciate the positive impacts subsidized housing can have on
communities (Galster et al. 2003) In a review of the literature on the effects of affordable
14

housing on property values, Nguyen examined 17 studies on the phenomenon and concluded that
the extent to which property values are lowered depends on the design and management of the
housing, the compatibility between affordable housing and the “host” neighborhood, and the
concentration of housing (2005:24).
In sum, the findings on neighborhood effects seem to suggest that it matters what
neighborhood you live in. It matters because having affluent neighbors more often has positive
social effects (Brooks et al 1993; Jencks 1992; Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987) than
negative ones (Johnstone 1978).
Given the conundrum of mixed priorities and mixed research related to housing policy in
general and HOPE VI in specific, the challenge remains for scholars to accurately delineate the
sociology of housing. Common themes abound and are appropriate for this analysis: household
and neighborhood effects on individuals; warehousing and its effects on concentrated poverty
and residential segregation; downtown disinvestment, physical decline, displacement, and
reinvestment through the HOPE VI program; and increasing housing costs, the shortage of
affordable housing and homelessness. These seemingly disconnected events and phenomena can
each be attributed to the tenuous balance between public and private interests.
Public housing in the United States has been stigmatized since the 1960s and 1970s while
concurrently experiencing shrinking federal funding, a dwindling supply of public housing units,
increased reliance on privatization policies, and weak enforcement of federal fair housing and
anti-discrimination laws (Gotham and Wright 1999; Rubin, Wright, and Devine 1992). What has
occurred is a net loss in the supply of housing for those with low-incomes, resulting from the
interplay of an array of economic and political forces.
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An affordability gap has developed as inner-city housing costs have increased more
quickly than incomes have (Stone 1993:33); these facts combine with the dwindling supply of
affordable housing to contribute to homelessness and near homelessness (Wright and Lam 1987;
Rubin, Wright, and Devine 1992; Schlay and Rossi 1992; Wright, Rubin, and Devine 1998). The
proponents of the structural theory of homelessness have correctly (though somewhat dryly)
concluded that without housing an individual is homeless by definition. Indeed, a survey of
homeless people in San Francisco asked what “the most important issues you face or problems
you have trying to make it in San Francisco or generally in life” (Ball and Havassy 1984). 94%
of the homeless people interviewed replied “no place to live indoors.” The next most common
response, mentioned by 88%, was “no money.” No other issues were reported more frequently
than 50%.
Rubin et al. argue that “at a sufficiently abstract level, the connections between poverty,
the housing supply, and homelessness may seem dim. At the level where life is lived, the
connections are stunningly obvious” (1992:111). The fact is, the cost of housing has come to
exceed what many impoverished families and persons can afford to pay.
But not everyone agrees that evidence for the structural theory of homelessness is
thoroughly convincing. Main (1996) disagrees that the tightening of the low-income housing
market has been as dramatic as the structural theorists suggest. He concludes that social policy
must more fully take into account the personal disabilities of the homeless if we want to fully
understand why they have no place to live indoors.
While Wright et al. claimed that the low income housing ratio tightened by 101%, Main
argues that this figure is actually only 26%. As a result, he concludes that the macro-level trends
that supposedly contribute to increasing homelessness exist, but are not as dramatic as
16

proponents have posited. A methodological mismatch prevents Main’s findings from eclipsing
those in the structural camp, however. Wright et al. studied 12 cities in their report, while Main
studied 18 cities. It is not the numerical incongruence that matters per se, but rather the reasons
proponents of the structural theory of homelessness declined to study the cities they did.
For instance, Wright et al. declined to include New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago in
their study because the homelessness problems there were particularly severe. In addition, Seattle
was excluded because it had the largest shelter for homeless men west of the Mississippi River.
Four other cities were excluded because data was not available (Cleveland, Houston, Milwaukee,
and St. Louis).
Main, on the other hand, included data on Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York,
Seattle, and St. Louis. The discrepancies between Main’s (1996) findings and those of Wright
and his colleagues (1987; 1989) likely lie in the sampling technique. In attempting to relegate the
causes of homelessness to personal disabilities, Main’s critique, while enjoying the benefit of
nearly ten years of hindsight, nevertheless fails to persuade. In short, his study was not an
accurate enough replication to adequately rebut the structural theory of homelessness.
Other, more recent research supports the structural theory. Three out of ten households
nationwide (both owners and renters included) experience financial hardship to cover housing
costs (Colton 2003:135). For urban America affordable housing constraints are especially dire: in
five of the nation’s ten most populous cities the percentage of renters who pay more than half of
their income to rent is above 20% (Turk 2004:914). The number of Americans in poverty has
risen steadily every year for the last five years, from 11.3% in 2000 to 12.7% in 2004 (US
Census). These stark economic realities are, unfortunately, not mutually exclusive.
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In the context of yearly increases in the number of Americans below the poverty level,
any attrition of the low-income housing stock is alarming. Those on the economic edge are most
susceptible to becoming homeless. A qualitative study of single African-American and Puerto
Rican mothers in Philadelphia revealed the strategies some are forced to use to cope with the
shortage of affordable housing. Clampett-Lundquist (2003) interviewed 18 women from two
different low-income neighborhoods about their struggles keeping a roof over their families’
heads. Two excerpts deserve mention here.
Regarding the choice between paying rent and paying utilities, one mother of two said:
“One month I had to pay the rent late, because they were going to cut my water off. So I had to put
some of the rent money toward that so I wouldn’t get my water cut off…How could I cook for [my kids],
and give them a bath and everything? I said, I can’t do that to my kids. [Did she want to evict you?] Yeah.
She wanted to throw me out. She said, ‘you didn’t pay me the whole rent’” (Clampett-Lundquist
2003:133).

Of the neighborhood disorder that accompanies these women’s limited housing choices,
another mother reported:
“Right now the Northeast is more expensive, so I’m thinking of going back down North [to
Kensington]. I know it’s more dangerous down there, and there’s more drug activities, and more violence,
but I guess as long as I don’t let my kids be around it…I know it’s not a good area for me, you know, for
me to take my kids down to that area, but if I have no other choice, I have to do it. You know, I’ll just have
to keep a better look-out for my kids, make sure nothing’s jumpin’ off in front of our place” (ClampettLundquist 2003:135-136).

Being a poor person in the inner city necessitates learning to negotiate potentially
dangerous public spaces (Anderson 1999). While virtually no one today finds “warehousing” the
poor acceptable, the realities of the private housing market are harsh indeed. That has not
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prevented federal housing policy from promoting the displacement of subsidized families to
make way for redevelopment.

Foundations of Displacement Research
The first wave of housing dispersal policy that followed the passage of the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 stimulated a fair amount of scientific interest in inner-city housing issues (for a
review see Gale 1984); unfortunately, most of it centered on the characteristics of gentrifying
households. Less solid is the foundation of research on the characteristics of displaced
households – those who are relocated to make way for the demolition or renovations necessary
for downtown reinvestment (Gale 1986).
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 sought to minimize the hardships
experienced by displaced people by tightening the regulations governing redevelopment projects
that utilized displacement. Short (1966) argued that:
“even in light of ‘tighter’ relocation requirements it seems that ‘successful’ relocation programs
are the exception rather than the rule, and that local public agencies have failed to consider exhaustively the
fact that relocation is a task involving people who oftentimes have unique needs, desires, and abilities. One
wonders if the exception will continue to prevail” (Short 1966:62).

Short used national survey data from a sample of 2,842 families who were relocated from
urban renewal sites. Sponsored by the Housing and Home Finance Agency in 1964-1965, the
results of the study concluded that 94 percent of relocated families were subsequently “living in
standard housing,” and on this basis claimed “success.” Short took issue with the presentation of
findings: the problem was that 542 of the original 2,842 families “were ‘lost’ and no information
is given on their rehousing; and no information is given on the number of families moving to
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areas that may be cleared in the future” (Short 1966:64-65). This is a common theme in research
on displacement due to redevelopment – attrition of subjects during the relocation process occurs
for any number of reasons and must be accounted for when attempting to generalize about entire
displaced population. The use of misleading statistics can cloud researchers’ appreciation for the
magnitude of the social effects of urban redevelopment.
Researchers such as Fried (1963) report wide variation in the post-relocation experiences
of former slum residents. While some feel little or no sense of loss, others experience a profound
void – Fried’s (1963) case study of urban relocation in Boston concluded that the feelings
experienced by some former residents were most aptly characterized as grief. Some relocated
residents lamented the loss of friends; others had nervous breakdowns or experienced nausea,
and some even harbored suicidal ideations (1963:360). Displacement can entail the disruption of
an individual’s entire social network outside the family. Findings on the effects of displacement
during the urban renewal era led to the drafting of the earlier-discussed 1970 URA, which
established standards for federal programs that move people to make way for economic
development.
According to Clay (1979) several vulnerable groups are likely to be affected by
displacement. They are low and moderate-income renters, low-income homeowners, the elderly,
minority households, and the transient population. The redevelopment of downtown areas often
includes the removal of residential hotels and other sources of emergency shelter that serve
vulnerable populations like these.
In particularly tight housing markets (like Orlando’s), households are often forced to
make sacrifices in their standard of living. Low-income families may be forced to move to
undesirable areas when redevelopment raises their rent. Minority households face racial
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prejudice in the private housing market which limits their access to decent, affordable housing.
The elderly experience the same problems as low-income renters in addition to the complications
of physical hardship and psychological trauma (Clay 1979). Fullilove (2004) also maintains that
displaced persons experience a sense of profound psychological shock; this hypothesis was
empirically tested on a specific population by Watson (1980).
Watson’s case study focused on elderly residents who were involuntarily relocated from a
long-term care institution in the northeastern United States. 98 percent of the 126 residents were
black. About 50 percent of these elderly blacks were moved to facilities that were predominantly
white, while some relocated to predominantly black facilities and about 8 percent moved into
private homes with family or friends.
Changing residences requires personal adjustment to the new environment, and these
adjustments can be especially distressing to the elderly. Watson found a variety of variables that
were related to survival and successful adjustment following relocation. High physical self
maintenance ability, high mental status, and extroversion explained much of the difference
between those who died within four to five months following relocation and those who did not.
Especially provocative is the finding that 100 percent of the residents who died following
relocation were women. Watson concluded that these women felt more loneliness and
dissatisfaction than their matched counterparts; they also had lower levels of physical selfmaintenance, mental status, and extroversion (Watson 1980:110).
A report authored by HUD in 1981 provided the first glimpse into the magnitude of
residential displacement nationwide. PSID data showed that about 1 percent of urban families
were displaced every year. According to HUD, this constituted a bit less than 5 percent of all
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movers annually. Slightly less than 8 percent of respondents were evicted without just cause or
for remodeling or renovation, the most obvious indicators of displacement due to redevelopment.
HUD also reviewed several specific case studies of neighborhoods and found that
displacement occurred more frequently in certain urban areas where redevelopment efforts were
taking place. About a quarter of all movers in redeveloping areas of San Francisco and
Cincinnati were identified as displaced by revitalization. HUD concluded that displacement due
to redevelopment was not a widespread, national trend. In certain cities and small areas the
phenomenon was more significant but not substantial “when expressed as a percentage of all
households” (HUD 1981:37).
Consistent with HUD’s findings, a follow up study conducted by Schill and Nathan
(1983) examined 9 gentrifying neighborhoods in 5 cities (Boston, Cincinnati, Denver,
Richmond, and Seattle) and found an average rate of displacement of 23 percent. Obviously
displacement was occurring to a significant degree in areas undergoing redevelopment. Still, in
1986 Gale concluded that “gentrification-induced displacement [had] not reached proportions in
the nation as a whole sufficient to justify either federal or state programs for displacement
mitigation or relief [due to the range in variation from neighborhood to neighborhood]”
(1986:19). Gale does not offer a threshold after which displacement mitigation becomes
necessary. But the fact that displacement most often occurs in areas undergoing redevelopment
means that there will never be a situation where nationwide displacement warrants legislative
remedy.
Gale’s (1986) suggestion that the magnitude of gentrification-induced displacement
should not warrant concern cannot erase the fact that the poor and minorities were being
displaced at a higher rate than the non-poor and whites (HUD 1981). Despite this inequality,
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displacement is not always the negative experience one might expect. For those displaced from
1970-1977, the effects of displacement were not pervasive, were not always detrimental, and did
not always result in the most severe consequences for the least well-off, implying that displaced
families generally manage to rebound from hardship (Newman and Owen 1983).
Despite half-hearted efforts to lessen concentrations of minorities and poor people,
proportions of extremely poor public housing residents were increased by federal legislation in
1979, 1981, and 1984 and by preferences established for households with incomes below 50% of
the area median, households involuntarily displaced or living in substandard housing, homeless
households, and households paying more than 50% of their income on rent (Spence 1993).
Housing authorities were required to offer public housing to these groups first; in time, these
preferences produced the pathological conditions in the projects we are familiar with today. In its
attempts to provide decent housing for those who could not afford it, the federal government had
unwittingly adopted a warehouse-style approach. This approach included mixing elderly and
disabled residents with low-income residents, with serious consequences in some cases
(Heumann 1998). It was this warehouse-style approach that ultimately fueled negative the
negative image of public housing perceived by many today (Hirsch 1983; Vale 1995, 2001).

Research on Displacement under HOPE VI
Today the federal government spends billions to relocate former project families into the
private housing market. The most basic programmatic premise of HOPE VI is that it lessens the
concentration of poverty by eliminating units of public housing. But relocation under HOPE VI
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consists of dispersing 2 potentially more than half of all the former residents of demolished
projects into the private housing market, subsidizing some with Section 8 vouchers 3 . One of the
few active federal programs that produce new housing, HOPE VI provides grants to local public
housing authorities (PHAs) to demolish severely physically “distressed” public housing projects.
In 1989, Congress created the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing with the goal of eliminating the nation’s worst public housing by the year 2000 (GAO
1997, 1998; Watt 2003). The Commission’s 1992 report identified about 89,000 units of public
housing (or 6% of HUD’s total units of public housing) that were so physically deteriorated that
rehabilitation was not economically feasible (GAO 1997, 1998; Watt 2003).
From 1993 to the end of 2002, HUD had awarded PHAs with $4.5 billion in HOPE VI
funds, of which $2.1 billion had been spent (GAO 2003:3). During that same decade-long span
78,265 public housing units were scheduled for demolition; of the planned 85,327 newly
constructed or rehabilitated units, 44,757 would be units of public housing (GAO 2003:6).

2

HOPE VI is by no means the first housing dispersal policy to be implemented in the latter half of the 20th century.

The first major efforts to disperse subsidized households began in the late 1960s with the passage of the Fair
Housing Act (Goetz 2003). This legislation was formed to reduce residential segregation but it effectiveness was
limited by staffing cuts and lax enforcement of regulations (Massey and Denton 1993).
3

HUD’s Section 8 program, also known as the housing choice voucher program, subsidizes rent for eligible

individuals and families. Most commonly, Section 8 recipients pay 30% of their income to rent and the remainder is
subsidized by the PHA. One of the Section 8 program’s strengths is also a major weakness. Voucher recipients
choose where they want to live, but many landlords choose not to honor vouchers. Also, waiting lists to receive a
Section 8 voucher are often years long, as the number of cost-burdened households far exceeds available funding
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2006).
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Significant national legislation passed in 1995 and 1998 changed the look of HOPE VI.
Until the mid 1990s, by law, every demolished unit of public housing was to be rebuilt so as to
ensure that the total stock of federally-subsidized housing did not dwindle. The 1995 Rescissions
Act suspended the requirement that every unit of public housing be replaced at a 1/1 ratio. This
development marked a significant shift in federal public housing policy. HUD subsequently
began to encourage PHAs to use demolition to reduce density (GAO 1998). The General
Accounting Office reported the effects of HUD’s then-current emphasis on demolition and deemphasis on replacement. They found that, as of the end of fiscal year 1996, 74% of demolished
units of public housing would be replaced (GAO 1998:82).
If there is a lack of coherence that prohibits researchers from reaching sound conclusions
regarding the degree and effects of displacement in the United States today, it is certainly not for
a lack of case studies. In fact, each site where HOPE VI funds are used to remove units of public
housing and transform the economic mix downtown provides a natural experiment for the social
effects of gentrification.
Keating (2000), writing about Atlanta’s Centennial Place HOPE VI redevelopment,
determined that 62% of the original 1,195 units of public housing were replaced after demolition.
This percentage lies between the pre-1995 legislation replacement ratio and the ratio at the end
of 2002, which was 57% 4 . It is to be expected, then, that the replacement ratio for Orlando’s
Carver Court HOPE VI redevelopment would be equal to or less than 57%.

4

According to GAO (2003) statistics cited from 1993 to the end of 2002 (44,757 newly constructed units of public

housing / 78,265 units of public housing demolished = .5718).
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The HOPE VI program has at least one positive side effect in that it thins population
density at the neighborhood level. HOPE VI is based on the same policy paradigms that guided
the slum relocation efforts of the 1937 Housing Act. By eliminating problem neighborhoods and
dispersing their former residents throughout the city, the assumption is that the social problems
that accompanied life in the public housing projects will disappear.
Smaller municipalities are now jumping on the HOPE VI bandwagon after an emphasis
on “leveraging” was added. Leveraging consists of forging public-private partnerships that pool
capital to allow HUD to get more bang for its redevelopment buck by using their HOPE VI grant
as a sort of carrot for would-be developers and investors. During the first two years of HOPE VI,
before leveraging was emphasized, grants averaged about $45 million. By 1997, the average
grant was about $21.6 million, reflecting the intent of more recent grantees to leverage outside
funding for redevelopment.
A 1998 HUD policy has further encouraged leveraging private funds using public grants,
since the total cost of development can no longer exceed industry averages. Since HOPE VI
developments are often more expensive than the average apartment complex, the 1998
requirement makes it a certainty that public-private partnerships will continue.
The leveraging requirement allows HUD to distribute more grants to more cities, but the
partnerships created by the leveraging requirement often do not play out smoothly in practice.
Coordinating the different partners’ schedules with redevelopment is a time-consuming task. To
further complicate things, from August 1996 to March 1998, the number of experts in leveraged
financing at HUD dropped from five to two. As was stated earlier, leveraging became the norm
during roughly the same period (GAO 1998:24).
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One other regulation added to the HOPE VI grant program in 2000 that deserves special
attention was a requirement that PHAs track residents who are relocated prior to redevelopment.
Almost eight years after the first residents were relocated under HOPE VI, the fiscal year 2000
appropriations act set aside $1.2 million for the Urban Institute to evaluate the long-term effects
of the HOPE VI program on former residents (GAO 2003). The results of the Urban Institute’s
resident tracking survey are discussed later.
A GAO report authored in 2004 looked at relocation issues at HOPE VI sites which were
awarded grants in 1996 (the first year HUD encouraged combining public and private funding).
Citing HUD data, they report that almost 49,000 residents had been relocated as of June 30,
2003. Approximately 50 percent of those relocated were moved into other public housing units.
About 31 percent used vouchers to rent in the private housing market. Approximately 6 percent
were evicted, and about 14 percent relocated themselves without giving notice or “vacated for
other reasons” (GAO 2004:3-4).
These numbers are a bit misleading, however, because they are drawn from “official”
statistics. A significant, but unknown number of people live in public housing without actually
signing a lease. The survey data collected for this study does not include information on other
individuals who may have lived with the official lessee; future research should seek to track
these individuals and record their experiences as well.
Current efforts to redistribute urban poverty may have unintended side effects for
neighborhoods who take in the nearly 50 percent of families who are relocated or are lost to their
local PHA during HOPE VI redevelopment. During the 1990s the number of people living in
census tracts with more than 40 percent poverty declined significantly. However, according to
Galster (2005), a reduction in the incidence in high poverty neighborhoods cannot be
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automatically tied to overall well-being in urban America – programs like HOPE VI that seek to
deconcentrate urban poverty sometimes only succeed in spreading the problem around.
For proof he shows that census tracts with between 10 and 20 percent poverty and tracts
between 20 and 40 percent poverty each experienced a rise in poverty rates equal to 1 percent. 1
percent may not seem a significant change, but to Galster, a 1 percent poverty increase means
many of these lower-income neighborhoods may have been pushed over their poverty thresholds.
When a census tract passes a poverty threshold somewhere between 15 and 20 percent, a certain
level of concentration is reached which has negative external social effects for neighbors (Galster
2005:123). According to Galster, programs like HOPE VI that redistribute poor families – while
lessening extreme concentrations of poverty – fail to ensure that poverty is dispersed in a manner
that does not harm other neighborhoods.
An examination of the spatial distribution of Section 8 recipients relocated from 73
HOPE VI developments through May 2000 reveals that the majority of those relocated moved to
neighborhoods with lower poverty rates than those they moved from, but reductions in racial
concentrations were not dramatic. The average minority rate was 79 percent in highly clustered
tracts (those with Section 8 shares of 10 percent or more), but only 28 percent where the Section
8 share was less than two percent (Kingsley, Johnson, and Pettit 2003). The careful observer is
forced to note that despite reductions in the overall concentration of poverty, these
concentrations still exist for racial minorities living in poverty. It is quite possible that relocation
under the HOPE VI program constitutes a new method of residential segregation.
Neighborhood relations among public housing residents vary somewhat, according to
whether their particular unit is located among non-poor households (known as scattered-site
housing) or clustered with other units of public housing. Residents in scattered-site housing
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know their neighbors and are embedded in their neighborhood just as much as those who live in
clusters of public housing. The two groups also differ very little in the amount of help they get
from neighbors. However, scattered-site residents feel less emotionally close to their neighbors
(Kleit 2001). It would be interesting to know whether this is due to disparities in social status, or
whether the lack of emotional closeness merely explains normal behavior in more affluent
neighborhoods.
HUD recently contracted the Urban Institute to conduct a resident tracking survey to
provide a snapshot of the current living situation of original residents from eight HOPE VI sites
around the country (Urban Institute 2002). In all, 818 residents were asked questions regarding
current housing quality, neighborhood and social environment, employment, material hardship,
and health. These questions are important because the goal of HOPE VI is to improve the lives of
residents of severely distressed housing no matter where they decide to relocate. Also, many of
the measures in this study of the Carver Court HOPE VI process use similar measures of postdisplacement satisfaction.
The Urban Institute found that most of the residents in the sample are living in
neighborhoods that have lower poverty rates than their old neighborhoods, and that, in the
majority, the original residents were satisfied with their current living situation. On the other
hand, of those who relocated to other public housing or used Section 8 vouchers, a substantial
proportion reported problems with drug trafficking and violent crime. Further, about half of
those who relocated out of public housing to the private housing market had problems meeting
housing expenses. Despite these problems, the Urban Institute concluded that overall, the lives of
the original residents of HOPE VI sites had improved (Urban Institute 2002).
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A new HOPE VI regulation added in 2000, will inevitably increase both the number and
relevance of displacement evaluations nationwide. The regulation stipulates that grant recipients
track the original residents of HOPE VI redevelopment sites in order to ensure that the lives of
public housing residents lives will actually be improved (GAO 2003). The Urban Institute’s
(2002) “comprehensive” resident tracking survey uses data from 1992 to 2001 – resident
tracking in the first nine years of this ten-year span was performed voluntarily. The fact that
grantees were not required to keep track of displaced residents until 2000 limits the validity of
the Institute’s findings because data gathered before the new regulation would presumably come
from grantees that placed a disproportionate emphasis on providing high quality social services
to their public housing residents.
As a result, any attempt at a nationally representative, systematic study of HOPE VI
displacement has only been possible since that regulation was added. The researcher cannot help
but wonder what a comprehensive evaluation of HOPE VI displacement conducted after the
regulation was added would reveal. The question remains whether a keener understanding of
displacement will mar the generally positive implementation analyses that have been previously
reported. Conversely, if displaced residents’ lives are improved as a result of HOPE VI
redevelopment, this finding will further bolster most of the prior evaluations of this HUD policy.
Despite this threat to validity, the Urban Institute’s resident tracking survey study
contained a finding particularly noteworthy to this analysis: 40 percent of the residents moved to
census tracts with poverty rates below 20 percent, while 40 percent moved to tracts with poverty
rates over 30 percent (2002:110). Housing policy researchers have generally agreed on the 20
percent poverty threshold, meaning that neighborhoods with more than 20 percent of the
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population below the poverty line experience negative outcomes. This line of reasoning clearly
derives its inspiration from Crane’s (1991) epidemic theory of ghettos.
The potential to test whether poverty deconcentration (a major goal of HOPE VI) has
occurred is one of the strengths of this report and others that analyze displacement data. Previous
research reported significant reductions in poverty rates using Census tract data (Kingsley,
Johnson and Pettit 2003). In the 1990s, according to Kingsley et al, the number of urban census
tracts with more than 40 percent of their residents living in poverty fell significantly. Other
researchers countered that HOPE VI did not truly deconcentrate poverty, that poor residents were
in fact dispersed among tracts with already-moderate levels of poverty, pushing some beyond
their acceptable poverty thresholds (Goetz 2002; Galster 2005). Galster (2005) notes that while
the number of high poverty (40 percent or more) census tracts did indeed fall in the 1990s, the
number of tracts with poverty rates from 10 percent to 20 percent and 30 percent to 40 percent
each rose one percentage point.
Since HOPE VI displacement in particular is a relatively small-scale phenomenon, it
might not affect a population aggregate as large as a census tract. A closer, block group-level
analysis of the spatial redistribution of displaced residents would enable researchers to more
accurately scrutinize the extent to which poverty deconcentration has occurred. Using a smaller
aggregate would generate increased measurement sensitivity and draw out the presumably subtle
effects of HOPE VI displacement on the poverty rates of surrounding neighborhoods.
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METHODOLOGY

Data
Much 5 of the data used in this study was collected as part of an impact assessment 6
requested by the OHA in compliance with HOPE VI grant standards. Displaced former residents
of Carver Court were interviewed for approximately 15 minutes about various aspects of the
relocation experience. Graduate students at the University of Central Florida’s Institute for the
Social and Behavioral Sciences recorded the respondents’ post-relocation answers to questions
about their occupational situation, access to public transportation, social interactions,
neighborhood quality, safety from crime, building safety and sanitation, and life overall. Also
used in this study are measures of change in living expenses such as transportation costs, utility
costs, and the overall cost of housing.
Of the 148 families who were relocated prior to demolishing the former project, only 55
were successfully interviewed (yielding a response rate of about 37%). Two of those 55 are
excluded from this study because one did not report current residence type and one bought a
home after relocating, in contrast to the other respondents who relocated to other public housing,
received a Section 8 voucher, or entered the private rental housing market. It is important to note

5

The data used to measure poverty deconcentration is derived from the 2000 decennial census. Additional

information on census data collection methods can be found at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/refroom.html.
6

The survey instrument used in this study can be found in Appendix A.
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that the data used as the backbone of the study is a convenience sample and is not representative
of displaced residents of Carver Court, or of HOPE VI redevelopment sites generally.
Since the selection method for the sample is not random based on a known population,
certain groups are likely to be overrepresented. For instance, those who relocate to other public
housing or use Section 8 vouchers were easier to contact using OHA records simply because
their information was still current. Respondents who no longer receive assistance from the OHA
would not be compelled to keep their contact information up-to-date and, as a result, are
underrepresented in this study. Also underrepresented in the sample are those who may have
moved in with friends or family following displacement. Those no longer receiving assistance
and those who “doubled-up” with friends or relatives might have significantly different
perspectives of the overall displacement experience.
The loss of these two groups of potential respondents from the sample severely limits
both the validity of this study and displacement research generally. This limitation could be
countered in future research by collecting pre-relocation data on the original residents of HOPE
VI sites. As it stands, the retrospective nature of the data collected for this study relies on
investigative research techniques and the recall abilities of respondents who are still available for
interviews.
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Measures

Demographic Variables
The sociodemographic variables used in the analysis are race, gender, and age.
Respondents’ genders were coded (0) male or (1) female based on interviewer perception.
Participants’ race or ethnicity was coded (1) Black, African American, (2) Hispanic, Latino,
Spanish speaking, (3) Asian, (4) White, or (5) other. Displaced residents’ ages were recorded by
reported year of birth.

Type of Residence Relocated To
The displaced residents of Orlando’s Carver Park HOPE VI redevelopment project were
moved either to other public housing units or into the private housing market. People who chose
to relocate to the private housing market included those using Section 8 vouchers and those
independent of government housing subsidy. The survey asked, “What type of residence are you
now living in? Is it: (1) Another OHA property, (2) Section 8 rental, (3) Private rental, (4) We
bought a home, or (5) Living with friends or family member.” Those who relocated using
Section 8 vouchers and those who relocated to the private housing market on their own are
collapsed into a single category for this analysis7 . This distinction makes possible a comparison
between the relocation outcomes of two separate, but supposedly-equal categories of displaced

7

Also, one respondent bought a home after being displaced – data on this respondent is omitted from this analysis

because of the relative insignificance of the finding. No respondents reported living with friends or family members.
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residents and forms the basis of subsequent analyses of the Carver Park redevelopment. The
HOPE VI program strives to improve the lives of all original residents of redevelopment sites no
matter where they choose to relocate. If significant inequalities exist between those relocated to
public housing and those relocated to private housing, this finding would be of special interest to
federal housing policymakers.

Post-Displacement Satisfaction
The relationships examined in this study focus on the similarities and differences between
those relocated from dilapidated public housing into either other public housing units or private
housing. A series of questions asked respondents to compare their current living situation with
their former situation at Carver Court. The questions used in this analysis focus on job
opportunities, access to public transportation, interactions with neighbors, the neighborhood
itself, safety from crime, and life overall. Respondents’ indicated whether they their respective
situations were (5) much better, (4) better, (3) same, (2) worse, or (1) much worse.
Next, this analysis reports on any expenses incurred as a result of displacement. Survey
participants were asked how their expenses changed since moving. The questions used in this
analysis ask whether costs have (3) increased, (2) decreased, or (1) stayed the same for
transportation, utilities, other expenses, and overall cost of housing. These responses were
recoded (3) increased, (2) stayed the same, and (1) decreased.
Finally, to obtain a more accurate measure of post-displacement satisfaction, a question
gauging change in respondents’ overall quality of life is examined. It reads, “On the whole,
would you say that your overall quality of life has gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the
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same as a result of your move to your new location?” Answers were coded (3) gotten better, (2)
stayed the same or (1) gotten worse.

Poverty Deconcentration
Lessening concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in non-poverty
neighborhoods and promoting mixed-income communities is a major policy goal of HOPE VI.
By using the data collected in this survey the outcomes of this effort can be assessed. Street
addresses were obtained from all survey participants – this information can be used to determine
the percentage of people below poverty level in the neighborhood to which the respondent
relocated. This information was obtained from 2000 decennial census data 8 by entering the postdisplacement addresses of former Carver Court resident to determine their block group and its
corresponding poverty rate. If the neighborhood poverty level at the respondent’s new address is
not significantly lower than the poverty level at the Carver Court address, then one must
conclude that the poverty deconcentration component of HOPE VI was not achieved in Orlando.

Study Methodology
Comparative analyses like those earlier reviewed do not suffice unless they are used to
ground the case study in a policy tradition. Likewise, a case study by itself is insufficient if it
does not fit into the “big picture” of the overarching policy debate. Effective policy analysis,

8

U.S. Census data can be found at http://www.census.gov/.
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therefore, can only be achieved by coupling specific case studies with comparative analyses
(Bracken 1981).
Part of this study focuses on those respondents who received Section 8 vouchers to
relocate. It is expected that Section 8 recipients will move to areas that are conducive to a better
quality of life since the nature of the voucher program provides some (albeit limited) choice in
residential location. This expectation is based on the assumption that, given the choice, displaced
residents of public housing would move to better-quality housing and neighborhoods – though
this would not be hard to accomplish in light of the distressed condition of their previous
dwellings. This expectation will be tested on two levels.
After a short descriptive discussion of the sample, I collapse it into two categories in
order to prepare for further analysis. The groups are (1) those who relocated to other public
housing (hereafter referred to as public housing residents) and (2) those who relocated with a
Section 8 voucher and those who relocated to other private housing (private housing residents).
The expected differences with regard to how much their lives have improved can be teased out
by first testing the hypothesis that the groups are independent using t-tests of statistical
significance.
Next, the evaluation uses Census data to compare the poverty rates of the block group
where the former Carver Court project was located with the poverty rates of the block groups to
which the Section 8 recipients relocated 9 . If the new block groups prove to have lower poverty

9

Measuring poverty rates at an even smaller aggregate (by block) would presumably generate more sensitive results

than those produced by a tract-level or block group-level analysis, however, poverty rate data is not available at the
block level.
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rates, then poverty deconcentration has actually occurred. If the new block groups have higher
poverty rates, or there is no significant difference, then deconcentration under HOPE VI is not in
fact deconcentration at all. Previous studies measured poverty deconcentration efforts using
tract-level data. A closer, block-level measurement could impart a more accurate understanding
of the extent of poverty deconcentration accomplished by the HOPE VI program.
To provide the framework from which HOPE VI displacement in Orlando can be
assessed, this study reviewed non-quantitative materials such as newspaper articles (McKay
2004; McKay 2005), normative policy analyses (Gotham and Wright 1999; Watt 2003; Wilson
1987; Wright and Lam 1987; Wright, Rubin and Devine 1998), ethnographic studies of housing
problems (Anderson 1999; Clampett-Lundquist 2004; Fullilove 2004; Rainwater 1970; Vale
2002), and historical descriptions of previous attempts to solve the nation’s housing issues
(Anderson and Massey 2001; Gale 1986; Galster 2005; Goetz 2003; Gotham and Wright 1999;
Jencks 1992; Keating 2000; Massey and Denton 1993; National Housing Association 1920;
Newman and Owen 1983; Schill and Nathan 1983; U.S. General Accounting Office 1998; Vale
2002). These non-quantitative, complementary comparative analyses, when combined with an
appropriate case study (or studies) contribute to the proper development of research-based urban
policy (Bracken 1981).
While there are relatively few HOPE VI case studies that focus solely on displacement,
there are more that attempt to describe the overall implementation of the policy. Most of these
evaluations resort to sampling grant recipients from a particular fiscal year (or years) looking for
patterns in community discourse or financial leveraging. It seems counterintuitive, however, to
look for consistencies in the implementation of a policy with ever-evolving regulations.
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HOPE VI, a descendant of devolution policies that relinquish federal responsibility, is
designed with local flexibility in mind. While it may be necessary to preserve flexibility so that
implementation can be tailored to local circumstances, the relative lack of consistency inherent in
devolution-style policies may have the effect of blunting any methodologically definitive
negative critique.

Study Hypotheses
I expect to find that former public housing residents experience starkly different
outcomes following the relocation experience depending on which type of housing they relocate
to.
HYPOTHESIS 1: All respondents should report increases in housing quality, though the
increases for those in private housing should be greater. Private housing residents should also
report greater satisfaction with neighborhood quality. Slums, ghettos, and distressed projects
have been characterized as physically blighted, socially disorganized, and economically
depressed. Former public housing residents relocating to other public housing units are not
expected to report greater satisfaction in these measures than private renters.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Those relocated to other public housing should not experience an
increase in housing costs to the extent that private renters do – the addition of utilities costs alone
could account for such a result.
HYPOTHESIS 3: The housing policy literature is rife with allusions to crime-ridden,
federally-supported housing projects. Those who move to the private housing market should
experience a lower incidence of crime than those who remain in public housing.
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HYPOTHESIS 4: Private housing market residents should report that their job situation
and job opportunities are better, on average, than those who stayed in public housing. Moving
out of public housing may enhance the confidence of labor market participants, as the stigma of
being a public housing resident no longer applies.
HYPOTHESIS 5: It is anticipated that private renters will report decreased access to
public transportation. Residents of public housing projects are more likely than private renters to
live near city centers – the hub of local public transportation.
HYPOTHESIS 6: The social interactions of former public housing residents should be
impacted by a move, whether it is to other public housing or the private rental market. Following
the move, I expect that public housing residents will experience greater satisfaction with their
social interactions. This hypothesis is based on the suggestion of researchers that more affluent
neighborhoods lack the social cohesion of low-income neighborhoods.
HYPOTHESIS 7: People who moved to the private housing market are expected to report
greater satisfaction with their overall quality of life. While the lives of all displaced residents are
expected to improve following their move from a severely distressed project, the improvement
should be greater for those moving from a project to the private market than those moving from
one project to another project. This expectation is based on the relative advantage imparted by
living in the private housing market, evinced by the majority of the hypotheses previously
enumerated.
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ANALYSIS

Post-Displacement Satisfaction

Univariate Analysis

Demographic Variables
Tables 1 through 6 report the demographic characteristics of the sample. Frequency
distributions for gender and race or ethnicity are followed by descriptive statistics detailing
respondents’ ages. When available, demographic data from secondary sources are used to
compare the sample of former Carver Court residents with larger populations of public housing
residents.

Table 1: Gender of Former Carver Court Residents

Gender

Male

Frequency

Percent

5

9.1%

Female

50

90.9%

Total

55

100.0%
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Table 1 reveals that 91 percent of the sample is female. While this is not a surprising
finding per se, it is nevertheless important to remember dominant demographic facts concerning
the sample so that any subsequent generalizations are maintained within the proper scope. Table
2 further displays the relatively homogeneous demographic characteristics of the Carver Court
sample and compares the reported race or ethnicity of the sample with race or ethnicity statistics
for all OHA residents.

Table 2: Comparison of Race or Ethnicity of Former Carver Court Residents and Race or
Ethnicity of Orlando Housing Authority Residents’ Head of Household

Carver Court
Race or ethnicity

OHA*

Freq

Percent

Percent

52

94.5%

71%

Hispanic, Latino, Spanish Speaking

1

1.8%

NA

White

1

1.8%

23%†

Other

1

1.8%

Black, African American

7%††

______________________________________
Total

55

100.0%

101%

* Source: Orlando Housing Authority Resident Characteristics Report, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/systems/pic/50058/rcr. Figures were reported 28 February, 2006.
† In the OHA statistics, “White” includes Hispanic or Latino (24%) and Non-Hispanic or Latino (76%).
†† In the OHA statistics, “Other” includes Asian only (1%) and other Pacific Islander only (6%).
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As Table 2 shows, almost 95 percent of the sample of former Carver Court residents are
Black or African American. This statistic tells us little, however, without more information on
the distribution of races or ethnicities of public housing residents from larger populations. Table
2 also illustrates the racial distribution of heads of household for all public housing residences
under the OHA’s purview, and provides an appropriate comparison for the study sample. While
almost 95 percent of the people in the original Carver Court sample are black, as of February
2006, only 71 percent of all OHA residents reported similarly. The cumulative disadvantage that
the respondents surveyed in this study experienced due to living in a distressed public housing
project in a dysfunctional neighborhood (read economic segregation) is compounded further by
racial residential segregation.
Table 3 compares the age distribution of the Carver Court sample with the age
distribution of all OHA residents.
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Table 3: Comparison of Distribution of Former Carver Court Residents’ Age and
Distribution of Ages of Residents under the Purview of the Orlando Housing Authority

OHA*

Carver Court

Freq

Percent

Freq

Percent

Age 0 – 5

625

17%

NA†

NA

Age 6 – 17

1351

37%

NA

NA

Age 18 – 50

1113

30%

34

61.8%

Age 51 – 61

233

6%

8

14.6%

Age 62 – 82

313

9%

7

12.7%

40

1%

6

10.9%

Age 83 +

___________________________________________
Total

3675

100%

55

100.0%

* Source: Orlando Housing Authority Resident Characteristics Report, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/systems/pic/50058/rcr. Figures were reported 28 February, 2006.
† The Carver Court sampling frame did not include respondents under age 18.

Over half of the OHA residents are children, and the age distribution of the Carver Court
sample roughly approximates the distribution for all OHA residents. Excluding those under 18
from Table 3 (54% of the sample), one finds that 65.5% of the remaining residents are 18 to 50
years old, 13.7% are 51 to 61 years old, 18.4% are 62 to 82 years old, and 2.4% are 83 and
above. The only noticeable difference between the two distributions occurs in the 83 and above
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category. More than 10 percent of the Carver Court sample is over 83, while less than three
percent of all OHA residents are.
Measures of central location are reported in Table 4 in order to further describe the age
demographics of the sample.

Table 4: Year of Birth of Former Carver Court Residents

Range of Birth Years

76* (1904-1980)

Mean Year of Birth

1958†

Median Year of Birth

1963

Modal Year of Birth

1978

* Range calculated from highest and lowest reported birth years (1980, 1904).
† Figure is rounded from 1958.02.

While there are noticeably more elderly residents in the Carver Court sample than there
are in the total OHA resident population, a wide range of ages in the sample produced
moderately interesting measures of location. While the average respondent’s age is 48, the
median age is 43. These two measures of location do not exactly match because of the modal
age, which is 28. In fact, 22 of the 55 respondents who answered this question were born after
1970 (ages 36 and under). So, while the Carver Court sample contained more elderly people by
proportion than the population from which it was drawn, the wide range in ages and the large
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subgroup of under-36-year-olds (40%) in the sample compensated to blur the differences in the
age distributions of the two comparison groups.
The final demographic characteristics examined concern children. Table 5 compares the
percent distribution of OHA households where children reside with the distribution for the
Carver Court sample.

Table 5: Comparison of Presence of Children in Former Carver Court Residents’
Household and Presence of Children in Residences under the Purview of the Orlando
Housing Authority

Carver Court

OHA*

Freq

Percent

Freq

Percent

Yes

35

64.8%

801

57%

No

19

35.2%

598

43%

Total

54†

100.0%

1399

100%

*Source: Resident Characteristics Reports are available from HUD and are tabulated using data from PHAs.
Accessed 12 March, 2006 at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/systems/pic/50058/rcr/.
† Responses do not total 55 because one respondent did not answer this question.

As Table 5 clearly shows, the sample of former Carver Court residents report the
presence of children in the household at a higher rate than the Orlando public housing population
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as a whole does. This is not entirely surprising, since a rather large proportion of the sample are
age 36 and under, and a far larger proportion are women. However, the fact that the Carver Court
sample has more children seems particularly salient given the distressed physical condition of
projects, and the disruptive effects of relocation on children. Table 6 shows how many children
former Carver Court residents live with.
Table 6: Number of Children in Former Carver Court Resident's Household

Number of Children

Frequency

Percent

1

11

32.4%

2

10

29.4%

3

6

17.6%

4

5

14.7%

5

1

2.9%

8

1

2.9%

Total

34*

100.0%

* One respondent who reported children present did not report the number of children in the household.

Table 6 shows that the overwhelming majority of former Carver Court residents live with
between one and four children (94.1%), and most live with just one or two children (61.8%). The
prevailing image of public housing recipients as female-headed households with large litters of
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children simply does not play out in this sample. While most OHA households are femaleheaded with children (54%), and most of the Carver Court sample consists of women with
children, there is no indication that the respondents in this study closely approximate the political
shibboleth of the 1990s – the reproductively-irresponsible “welfare mom.”

Type of Residence Relocated To
Table 7 illustrates the distinction drawn between those who remained in OHA public
housing units and those who relocated into the private housing market. This distinction forms the
basis of all subsequent measures of post-displacement satisfaction. The percent distribution for
the two groups is presented below.
Table 7: Type of Residence Former Carver Court Residents Relocated to

Residence Type

Frequency

Percent

Other public housing

34

64.2%

Private housing market*

19

35.8%

Total

53

100.0%

* Private housing market includes both Section 8 recipients and those paying market rent following displacement.

As Table 7 shows, almost two-thirds of the sample relocated to other OHA public
housing units following their displacement from Carver Court. This simple statistic lays bare a
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fundamental design problem with the HOPE VI program: If most former residents of HOPE VI
redevelopments choose to move to other public housing, and most of the low-income units are
not replaced in HOPE VI redevelopments, and HOPE VI is the federal housing policy of the
future, then might these facts conspire to lower the amount of low-income housing until an even
greater affordable housing shortage inevitably results?
The bivariate analysis that follows is based on the frequency distributions for the
variables of interest, which are located in Appendix B.

Bivariate Analysis
The next section of this study uses independent t-tests to search for relationships between
the various measures of post-displacement satisfaction and of the type of residence that the
respondent relocated to. The tables describing the analyses for each variable include the
calculated mean, mean difference, p-value, and t-value for each test. If the p-values generated
from these tests are less than 0.10, then the comparison has produced significant differences
between public and private housing residents. Table 8 presents the many post-displacement
satisfaction tests which failed to produce significant differences in the relocation groups, and
Table 9 displays the three comparisons which produced significant differences. A discussion of
the findings from both tables follows Table 9.
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Post-Displacement Satisfaction

Table 8: Non-Significant T-Tests of Comparisons of Post-Displacement Satisfaction by
Type of Residence Relocated to

Job situation
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.431, t = -0.798
Access to public transportation
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.324, t = 0.996
Interaction with neighbors
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.595, t = -0.538
Neighborhood itself
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.271, t = -1.114
Safety from crime
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.348, t = -0.949
Life overall
N

Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
28
17
3.04
3.29
-0.258
-0.258
______________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
31
18
3.26
3.00
0.258
0.258
______________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
33
16
2.94
3.06
-0.123
-0.123
_____________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
33
19
3.76
4.05
-0.295
-0.295
______________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
33
19
3.64
3.90
-0.258
-0.258
_______________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
34
17
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Mean
Difference
p = 0.169, t = -1.40

3.62
4.00
-0.382
-0.382
________________________________________

Table 9: Significant T-Tests of Comparisons of Post-Displacement Satisfaction by Type of
Residence Relocated to

Job opportunities

Type of residence
Public housing

Private housing

27

17

3.00

3.47

-0.471

-0.471

N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.081, t = -1.792

_____________________________________

Interaction with family

Type of residence
Public housing

Private housing

34

19

3.47

3.05

0.418

0.418

N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.069, t = 1.859

_____________________________________

Building safety and sanitation

Type of residence
Public housing

Private housing

34

19

3.56

4.32

-0.757

-0.757

N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.010, t = -2.693

_____________________________________
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Since the sample size is so small (N = 53), the use of t-tests to evaluate the difference
between those relocated to public or private housing does not yield consistently significant
findings. There were no statistically significant differences among the relocation groups in terms
of job situation, access to public transportation, interaction with neighbors, the neighborhood
itself, safety from crime, or life overall (see Table 8). These findings effectively disprove
Hypotheses 3 and 5, and threaten to disprove the remaining hypotheses examined thus far
(Hypotheses 1, 4, 6, and 7). It is clear from the frequency distributions reported in Appendix B
that both relocation groups experienced increased satisfaction after the move in many of these
measures; testing for the hypothesized differences between those moving to public versus private
housing, however, simply did not produce statistically significant results.
Three tests produced results which suggest inequities in post-displacement satisfaction
between the comparison groups, and are reported in Table 9. On average, those who moved to
other public housing perceived that their job opportunities “stayed the same.” Those who moved
to the private housing market perceived that their job opportunities were significantly better, as
the reported t-value (-1.79) and p-value (0.08) demonstrate. This finding is partially consistent
with Hypothesis 4. Private housing market residents may indeed have enhanced confidence in
their prospects for better employment opportunities; however, there was no significant difference
in job situation. This suggests that merely perceiving greater opportunity in the labor market
does not necessarily translate into improved job situations for those displaced from Carver Court.
Thus, the findings were not wholly consistent with the hypothesis tested.
The t-test of post-displacement family interactions also produced statistically significant
differences. The positive t-value (1.86) indicates that those who moved to other public housing
were more satisfied with their family interactions than private housing market residents were,
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and the p-value (0.07) indicates the significance of this finding. Hypothesis 6 predicted that
public housing residents would experience increased satisfaction with their social interactions in
comparison to private housing market residents because of researchers’ suggestions that more
affluent neighborhoods lack the social cohesion that disadvantaged neighborhoods often possess.
The fact that family interactions, but not interactions with neighbors, were better for public
housing residents possibly reflects the OHA practice of relocating public housing residents into
units with the appropriate number of bedrooms according to the number of household members.
Private housing market residents may have to accept housing with fewer rooms than their needs
require, negative consequences for the family could result from these cramped conditions.
The findings on building safety and sanitation are unambiguous. Those who relocated to
other public housing reported a mean score of 3.56, and those who relocated to private housing
reported a mean score of 4.32. The t-value produced, -2.69, is highly significant (p = 0.01),
meaning that there is only a 1% chance that the difference observed between the two groups in
this measure is due to sampling error. This means that those who relocated to the private housing
market were significantly more satisfied with their building safety and sanitation. This finding
lends strong support for Hypothesis 1, which suggested that people relocating to the private
housing market would be significantly more satisfied with their housing quality. But since there
were no significant differences between the groups with regard to the neighborhood itself,
Hypothesis 1 is only partially correct.
It is not surprising that both groups of respondents are more satisfied with their building
safety and sanitation, considering the baseline from which they formed their comparison – a
distressed public housing project. However, a t-value of this level of significance is especially
salient considering the size of the sample used in this study. Building safety and sanitation is
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clearly a measure of post-displacement satisfaction whose level of improvement depends on
what type of housing respondents relocate to.

Post-Displacement Expenses
It was expected that residents who move to the private housing market would report
significant differences in terms of housing expenses. Table 10 presents the results of the t-tests of
changes in transportation costs, commuting time, utility costs, other monthly expenses, and the
overall cost of housing.
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Table 10: T-Tests of Changes in Various Expenses by Type of Residence Relocated to

Transportation costs
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.650, t = -0.458
Commuting time
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.386, t = -0.879
Utility costs
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.381, t = -0.884
Other monthly expenses
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.852, t = -0.188
Overall cost of housing
N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.679, t = -0.417

Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
34
19
1.77
1.90
-0.130
-0.130
______________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
33
17
1.82
2.06
-0.241
-0.241
_______________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
34
19
2.44
2.63
-0.190
-0.190
________________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
34
19
2.00
2.05
-0.053
-0.053
________________________________________
Type of residence
Public housing
Private housing
34
19
2.26
2.37
-0.104
-0.104
________________________________________

As Table 10 clearly shows, none of the changes measured were statistically significant.
While the mean scores for both groups of displaced residents indicated that both utility costs and
the overall cost of housing increased, neither group’s expenses were significantly greater than the
other. The mean scores of the remainder of the measures of changes in expenses indicated that
expenses largely stayed the same for both groups of respondents. These findings thoroughly
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discredit Hypothesis 2, which postulated that expenses would increase for private housing
market residents more than they would for those relocating to other units of public housing.
Table 11 presents an analysis of the change in overall quality of life, again grouped by
type of residence relocated to.

Table 11: T-Test of Change in Overall Quality of Life by Type of Residence Relocated to

Overall quality of life

Type of residence
Public housing

Private housing

32

19

2.22

2.58

-0.360

-0.360

N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.096, t = -1.70

________________________________________

The mean scores for public (2.22) and private housing residents (2.58) indicate that, on
average, both groups feel that their overall quality of life has gotten better. However, the
significant p-value (0.096) suggests that the quality of life change for those who relocated to the
private housing market is better than it is for public housing residents. This is an interesting
finding considering that the preponderance of tests which were conducted did not produce
statistically significant differences in the comparison groups. The fact that private housing
market residents experienced significantly better outcomes in their overall quality of life suggests
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that there may be measures which were not examined in this study that might help explain this
finding. Regardless, the finding lends support to Hypothesis 7, even though the other measure
used to gauge this aspect of the analysis did not produce significant differences 10 .

Poverty Deconcentration
Every respondent in the sample relocated to a Census block group with a much lower
poverty rate than the Carver Court poverty rate, which was 63.5% 11 . This fact presents problems
with statistical significance despite the apparent difference in means between those who
relocated to other public housing and those who relocated to the private housing market.
Table 28 shows that the average change in poverty rate for those who moved to another
OHA project was -29.7%, while Table 29 shows the average change in poverty rate for those
who moved into the private housing market (-35.0%). It is noteworthy that only five of the thirtyfour respondents (14.7%) who moved to other public housing reported living in a block group
with poverty rates less than 20%, a crucial threshold previously identified in the review of the
literature. Only four of the nineteen (21.1%) respondents who relocated to the private housing
market said they lived in a block group under the 20% threshold.
In fact, those who moved to other public housing moved to block groups who average
poverty rate was 33.9%, well above 20%. Likewise, those who relocated to the private housing

10

It should be remembered that although the comparison of life overall did not produce significant differences (see

Table 8), both groups were satisfied with their lives “overall” following the move.
11

Tables 28 and 29, which are located in Appendix D, display the statistics reported in this section.
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market moved to block groups with an average poverty rate of 28.6%, also clearly above the
20% threshold.

Table 12: T-Test of Post-Displacement Poverty Rate by Type of Residence Relocated to

Change in poverty rate

Type of residence
Public housing

Private housing

34

19

0.34

0.29

0.053

0.053

N
Mean
Difference
p = 0.119, t = 1.60

________________________________________

An examination of the mean poverty rate scores in Table 12 reveals that public housing
residents have higher post-displacement poverty rates than private housing residents. The mean
score for public housing residents (0.34) and the mean score for private housing residents (0.29)
yields a mean difference of 0.05. The t-value 1.60 is marginally significant (p = 0.119),
indicating that a 12% chance exists that the difference is due to sampling error. Though the
significance level of this study was previously set at 0.10, the borderline nature of the p-value
generated, as well as the opportunity to comment on this test of one of the major goals of the
HOPE VI program are too important to gloss over.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since other evaluations of HOPE VI’s impact emphasize the improvements realized in
residents’ lives, this study sought to draw distinctions between what aspects of the relocation
experience worked best. An obvious line of demarcation in any HOPE VI sample separates
residents based on which type of housing they moved to. Those who moved to other public
housing serve as a sort of quasi-control group – since they moved from one public housing unit
to another. They do not constitute a true control since Carver Court was designated as a severely
distressed project. People who moved into the private housing market, either by using a Section
8 voucher or independently, effectively constitute a treatment group. These group distinctions
produced significant differences in four measure post-displacement satisfaction (job
opportunities, family interactions, building safety and sanitation, and change in overall quality of
life), and marginally significant differences in poverty deconcentration.
While both groups of respondents’ post-displacement job situations were similar, their
perceived job opportunities were not. This finding could be due to private housing residents’
newfound sense of responsibility, or, alternately, perhaps the experience of moving from the
projects to a more traditional housing unit engenders optimism generally. Perceived job
opportunities are not quite the same as one’s actual job situation; the difference in mean scores
for job opportunities (but not job situation) might illustrate this phenomenon.
Access to public transportation was not significantly different for either of the two
relocated groups, nor were significant differences found in measures of interaction with
neighbors, quality of the neighborhood itself, or life overall. Likewise, interactions with
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neighbors were similar for both groups following relocation. On average, respondents reported
improvements in the neighborhood itself, safety from crime, and life overall, though these
improvements were not significantly different between the comparison groups. The fact that
there is no statistically significant difference between those relocating to public or private
housing is promising for those who promote HOPE VI redevelopment. Since both groups
reported improvements in the neighborhood itself, safety from crime, and live overall, and these
differences were effectively uniform across the groups, these improvements have, on average,
been realized by the entire Carver Court sample. This is no paltry finding.
The Urban Institute’s 2002 HOPE VI resident tracking study did not take a measure
comparing the neighborhood itself, nor did they ask respondents to make a subjective
comparison of life overall. Their findings on crime, however, conflict with the safety from crime
findings presented here. The Urban Institute found significant differences between unsubsidized
and subsidized households (unsubsidized households were the least likely to report criminal
activity), further, those returning to the HOPE VI site after redevelopment had completed were
most likely to report “big problems” with crime. The Carver Court sample, as of the writing of
this report, has not had the option of returning to the new, redeveloped Carver Park, as
construction is not yet complete (Schlueb 2006). It would be informative to know how returning
Carver Park residents perceive their safety from crime following the revitalization of their
(formerly) severely distressed digs. As it stands, the Carver Court sample experienced, on
average, increased safety from crime across both groups.
Interestingly, public housing residents were more satisfied on average than private
housing residents with regard to post-displacement family interactions. The review of housing
policy literature presented in this report does not account for this seeming discrepancy in family
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interactions between public and private housing residents. A possible explanation is that the
method of relocation practiced by the OHA regarding public housing takes into account the
number of household members and their needs regarding bedroom capacity. Future studies of the
HOPE VI residential relocation process should seek to explore whether this management practice
accounts for the difference in post-displacement family interactions reported herein.
When respondents were asked how their overall quality of life had changed as a result of
being displaced by the Carver Court HOPE VI redevelopment process, both groups average
scores were between “stayed the same” and “gotten better.” However, those who moved into the
private housing market perceived that their quality of life had gotten significantly better than
those who moved to other public housing. This finding lends support to the logic of personal
responsibility and self-sufficiency: If given the opportunity to leave federally subsidized housing,
people’s lives will get better.
The most highly statistically significant finding in this study concerns building safety and
sanitation. Those who relocated to private housing were far more satisfied than their public
housing counterparts in this measure. This is not an especially moving or awe-inspiring finding
since all respondents moved from a severely distressed project into a presumably less-blighted
structure. It is no surprise then that both groups report improved building safety and sanitation,
and that private housing residents report an even greater improvement than public housing
residents.
From its inception, HOPE VI was designed primarily to deal with physical blight in
America’s projects. Just as the welfare reform of 1996 shifted the debate from human concerns
to cold, calculated entitlement reduction efforts, today HOPE VI prioritizes architectural
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improvement above social welfare. This prioritization accomplishes much in way of increasing
the tax bases of America’s cities at the expense of low income households.
During the 1990s when this policy was drafted, legislative philosophy revolved around
vague ideas of “personal responsibility” and “self-sufficiency.” To promote personal
responsibility, for example, welfare recipients were limited to two cumulative years of assistance
over their entire lifetime. This policy (necessarily) reduced the number of people on the welfare
rolls each year after its passage and is deemed a success by lawmakers today despite its logically
illusory underpinnings. Public housing and public assistance in general had undergone drastic
changes. These changes were far more concrete than the vague ideas which espoused them.
If American public housing policy truly ministered to the needs of its residents, then
perhaps less than 90% of former Carver Court residents would be women and less than 94%
would be black. As it stands, these traditionally-disadvantaged people were living in the most
dilapidated housing under the purview of the OHA before their displacement. Things clearly
have not changed since 1981, when HUD recognized that displacement disproportionately
affects the poor and minorities. However, projects like Carver Court are not nearly as physically
“distressed” as other HOPE VI sites around the country. But by allowing Carver Court to
deteriorate to the point of distress, the OHA was able to trade their worst project for a brand new
development.
It was reported previously that, as of 1996, 74% of the public housing units demolished
under HOPE VI were to be replaced. By 2002, the replacement rate was 57%. In Orlando’s
Carver Court HOPE VI redevelopment, 94 units of public housing will replace the 212 lost to
demolition – the remainder of the new construction will consist of housing for the elderly, and
affordable and market-rate houses and townhouses. This constitutes a public housing
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replacement ratio of 44.3% at the Carver Court site. The 1995 suspension of the 1/1 replacement
ratio in federal public housing, originally intended to clear one of the regulatory roadblocks to
redevelopment, has resulted in the dramatic transformation of the composition of public housing
sites receiving HOPE VI financing.
The resident tracking requirement added in 2000 should provide HUD, PHAs, and
housing policy researchers with the data to accurately determine whether the lives of the original
residents of HOPE VI sites have improved. A group of case studies of HOPE VI implementation
across Florida or the South could unearth patterns that would enable policymakers to further
reform this relatively recent piece of legislation. Each case study conducted after the 2000
resident tracking requirement was added contributes to the cumulative conception of the many
means by which displacement affects the lives of former residents of America’s most severely
distressed public housing projects.
A possible future area of research is suggested by the two ideologically-juxtaposed
regulations which altered HOPE VI in 1995 and 2000. Consider the following:
•

Nationally, 50% of the original residents of HOPE VI sites choose to move to
other public housing following displacement

•

64% of the residents of the original Carver Court site moved to other public
housing following displacement

•

Most low-income units are not replaced in HOPE VI redevelopments because of
the suspension of the 1/1 replacement ratio in federally subsidized housing

•

HOPE VI itself rests on the principles of devolution and is presumably HUD’s
model program for the future of American housing policy
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Weighing these realities, it is clear that HOPE VI is flawed in its design. The net loss of
public housing units and the desire of half of the former residents of HOPE VI sites to relocate to
other public housing will eventually intersect – and the displaced will have no choice but to
relocate to the private housing market. This is problematic because many public housing
residents are vulnerable to the volatile economic situations that exist in America’s private
housing market. Future researchers should attempt to find whether the affordability gaps created
by downtown redevelopment efforts resulting in a net loss of low-income housing increase the
incidence and prevalence of homelessness.
Finally, analyzing poverty deconcentration produced marginally significant differences in
means. Every respondent in this study relocated to a block group with a lower poverty rate than
the Carver Court block group poverty rate, which was 64%. The poverty rate for all residents in
Orange County was 12%. So, while the overall distribution of the Carver Court sample showed
large, uniform reductions in poverty rates, the reductions were to be expected since the block
group Carver Court was located in had the highest poverty rate by block group in Orange
County 12 .
The Urban Institute (2002) reported that 40% of the residents tracked in their study
moved to census tracts with poverty rates above 30% (their threshold for determining “high
poverty” neighborhoods), and 40% moved to tracts with poverty rates below 20%. For purposes
of comparison, 70% of the Carver Court sample moved to block groups with poverty rates above
30% and 17% moved to block groups with poverty rates below 20%. The obvious difference in

12

See Appendix C for a map illustrating poverty rates in Orange County by block group. The block groups are

colored according to their corresponding poverty rate “threshold”.
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post-displacement poverty rates does not appear to be due to any major difference in poverty
rates between the Orlando area and the United States in general. The poverty rates in the Orlando
metropolitan statistical area, Orange County, the state of Florida, the South, and the nation are,
respectively, 10.7%, 12.1%, 12.5%, 13.9%, and 12.4%.
While the Carver Court sample is less sophisticated than that used by the Urban Institute,
it remains unclear why most of the former residents of a distressed public housing project in
Orlando moved to other poor neighborhoods instead of moving to one of the many low-poverty
block groups in and around Orlando. Even those who relocated to the private housing market
(the group with the most influence over where they would reside after displacement) moved to
block groups with a 29% mean poverty rate. The HOPE VI program accomplished its poverty
deconcentration goal in redeveloping Carver Court, but an entirely new set of research questions
spring from this:
•

What are the poverty rates in the block groups where housing projects
administered by the OHA are located?

•

Were former Carver Court residents who stayed in public housing assigned to
units in block groups with lower poverty rates than the other projects the OHA
administers?

•

Why did 64% of the former Carver Court residents relocate to other projects
around Orlando instead of using a Section 8 voucher?

•

Why did 79% of those who relocated to the private housing market end up in
block groups with poverty rates over the 20% threshold?

•

Does economic “steering” explain why so many Section 8 recipients “chose” to
relocate to block groups with high concentrations of poverty?
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Methodological limitations, which were numerous in this study, prevented analyses that
might have answered some of the unanswered questions about HOPE VI implementation. Had
the sample or response rate been greater, the test that produced marginally significant results
might have been significant. Alternately, of course, their significance could have decreased
further. Obviously then, the overriding limitation in this study is the inability to infer much about
the differences between those who relocated to other public housing and those who relocated to
the private housing market due to small sample size. Small sample size also prevented the use of
more powerful parametric statistical techniques in measures of post-displacement satisfaction.
The findings and conclusions about HOPE VI implementation presented in this report are also
limited by the somewhat narrow scope of the survey questionnaire.
By traditional standards, only one of the post-displacement satisfaction variables
examined in this study produced significant results – the comparison of building safety and
sanitation. This finding implies that choosing to move from a distressed project to the private
housing market provides better building safety and sanitation than choosing to move to other
public housing. If the goal of HOPE VI is merely to improve physically blighted structures, then
the mission was accomplished in Orlando. If the goal is to measurably improve the lives of
residents no matter where they choose to relocate to, then further research on this process is
needed.
Developing the downtown tax base using devolution does not necessarily develop the
lives of those who are displaced to make way for the market-rent-paying, example-setting gentry.
The experience of displacement alone has historically been a disruptive one for individuals and
families – as the need to draft the URA in 1970 showed. Policymakers must not forget this fact
while fine-tuning HOPE VI or designing other federal programs that utilize displacement. Since,
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those who moved to the private housing market experienced marginally or highly significant
positive changes in access to job opportunities, overall quality of life, and building safety and
sanitation, more emphasis should be placed on pre-displacement counseling services, with the
goal of encouraging residents to relocate into the private housing market either using Section 8
vouchers or independently. This will more leave open units for those who cannot easily make the
transition (such as the elderly) and must remain in federally subsidized housing.
Future researchers of HOPE VI redevelopment sites (if given the luxury of a larger
sample) should examine what demographic characteristics might predict the type of housing to
which former residents choose to relocate. For example, are younger people more likely to
choose to move into the private housing market? Do men (who were underrepresented to the
point of insignificance in this study) who move into the private housing market use Section 8
vouchers more frequently than they relocate independent of subsidy? Further research on poverty
deconcentration might review the percentages of black people by block group to determine
whether poverty deconcentration constitutes a new form of racial residential segregation.
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APPENDIX B: TABLES OF UNIVARIATE ANALYSES
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Table 13: Comparison of Resident's Job Situation

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

4

7.3%

Worse

3

5.5%

Same

27

49.1%

Better

8

14.5%

Much better

5

9.1%

DK/NA

8

14.5%

55

100.0%

Total

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Table 14: Comparison of Resident's Job Opportunities

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

3

5.5%

Worse

1

1.8%

Same

30

54.5%

Better

8

14.5%

Much better

4

7.3%

DK/NA

9

16.4%

55

100.0%

Total

81

Table 15: Comparison of Respondent's Access to Public Transportation

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

2

3.6%

Worse

6

10.9%

Same

30

54.5%

Better

9

16.4%

Much better

4

7.3%

DK/NA

4

7.3%

55

100.0%

Total

Table 16: Comparison of Respondent's Interaction with Family

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

0

0.0%

Worse

7

12.7%

Same

30

54.5%

Better

13

23.6%

Much better

5

9.1%

DK/NA

0

0.0%

55

99.9%*

Total

* Figure does not add to 100.0% due to rounding.
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Table 17: Comparison of Respondent's Interaction with Neighbors

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

1

1.8%

Worse

9

16.4%

Same

32

58.2%

Better

8

14.5%

Much better

1

1.8%

DK/NA

4

7.3%

55

100.0%

Total

Table 18: Comparison of Respondent's Neighborhood Itself

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

1

1.8%

Worse

3

5.5%

Same

14

25.5%

Better

20

36.4%

Much better

16

29.1%

1

1.8%

55

100.0%

DK/NA

Total

83

Table 19: Comparison of Respondent's Safety from Crime
______________________________________________________________________________

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

1

1.8%

Worse

5

9.1%

Same

13

23.6%

Better

22

40.0%

Much better

13

23.6%

1

1.8%

55

99.9%*

DK/NA

Total

* Figure does not add to 100.0% because of rounding.

Table 20: Comparison of Respondent's Building Safety and Sanitation

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

2

3.6%

Worse

4

7.3%

Same

13

23.6%

Better

17

30.9%

Much better

19

34.5%

0

0.0%

55

99.9%*

DK/NA

Total

* Figure does not add to 100.0% because of rounding.
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Table 21: Comparison of Respondent's Life Overall

Frequency

Percent

Much worse

1

1.8%

Worse

4

7.3%

Same

15

27.3%

Better

20

36.4%

Much better

13

23.6%

2

3.6%

55

100.0%

DK/NA

Total

Table 22: Change in Respondent's Transportation Costs

Frequency
Decreased

Percent

1

1.8%

Stayed the same

32

58.2%

Increased

22

40.0%

Total

55

100.0%
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Table 23: Change in Respondent's Commuting Time

Frequency

Percent

7

12.7%

Stayed the same

26

47.3%

Increased

19

34.5%

3

5.5%

55

100.0%

Decreased

DK/NA

Total

Table 24: Change in Respondent's Utility Costs

Frequency
Decreased

Percent

6

10.9%

Stayed the same

10

18.2%

Increased

39

70.9%

Total

55

100.0%
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Table 25: Change in Respondent's Other Monthly Expenses

Frequency
Decreased

Percent

4

7.3%

Stayed the same

24

43.6%

Increased

27

49.1%

Total

55

100.0%

Table 26: Change in Respondent's Overall Cost of Housing

Frequency
Decreased

Percent

8

14.6%

Stayed the same

15

27.3%

Increased

32

58.2%

Total

55

100.1%*

* Figure does not add to 100.0% due to rounding.
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Table 27: Quality of Life for Respondent since Relocation

Frequency
Gotten worse

Percent

9

16.4%

Stayed the same

15

27.3%

Gotten better

29

52.7%

2

3.6%

55

100.0%

DK/NA

Total

88

APPENDIX C: MAP AND LEGEND OF PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS
BELOW POVERTY LEVEL IN ORANGE COUNTY BY BLOCK GROUP,
CLASSED BY THRESHOLD LEVEL
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APPENDIX D: POVERTY DECONCENTRATION TABLES
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Table 28: Change in Poverty Rate for those who relocated to Other Public Housing

ECS number
20109
9342
556
4048
4623
4595
101
6153
17203
4772
5071
704
5073
1885
6346
16394
5167
4845
4870
16175
12291
4755
5218
3983
121
4763
5075
4911
15540
4766
1670
5217
4033
4034

Post-relocation poverty rate
38.0%
23.2%
36.9%
38.0%
43.6%
32.2%
36.4%
13.1%
36.9%
36.4%
38.0%
36.4%
36.9%
36.4%
36.4%
32.2%
36.9%
43.6%
43.6%
36.9%
36.4%
44.4%
32.2%
53.7%
36.9%
53.7%
36.9%
7.7%
7.7%
38.0%
7.7%
7.7%
38.0%
38.0%

Change
-25.6%
-40.4%
-26.6%
-25.6%
-19.9%
-31.3%
-27.2%
-50.4%
-26.6%
-27.2%
-25.6%
-27.2%
-26.6%
-27.2%
-27.2%
-31.3%
-26.6%
-19.9%
-19.9%
-26.6%
-27.2%
-19.2%
-31.4%
-9.8%
-26.6%
-9.8%
-26.6%
-55.8%
-55.9%
-25.6%
-55.8%
-55.9%
-25.6%
-25.6%

____________________________________
Mean

33.9%

-29.7%

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest .1%.

92

Table 29: Change in Poverty Rate for those who Relocated to the Private Housing Market

ECS number
4879*
15524*
18728
5068
6040
4425
4331
16088*
5166
5213
17008
15871
7010
19750*
4526*
8712
5176
8807
5204

Mean

Post-relocation poverty rate
Change
44.4%
-19.2%
39.2%
-24.4%
23.1%
-40.4%
24.1%
-39.4%
17.5%
-46.0%
34.5%
-29.1%
23.4%
-40.2%
23.2%
-40.4%
38.0%
-25.6%
14.9%
-48.6%
12.4%
-51.2%
32.2%
-31.4%
36.9%
-26.6%
44.4%
-19.2%
44.4%
-19.2%
9.0%
-54.5%
36.9%
-26.6%
21.8%
-41.7%
23.2%
-40.4%
____________________________________
28.6%

-35.0%

* Denotes respondents who relocated to the private housing market without a Section 8 voucher.

93

LIST OF REFERENCES
Anderson, E. 1999. Code of the street: Decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner city.
New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Anderson, E. and Massey, D.S. 2001. Problem of the century: Racial stratification in the United
States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Ball, J.F. and Havassy, B.E. 1984. A survey of the problems and needs of homeless consumers
of acute psychiatric services. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 35:917-921.
Bracken, I. 1981. Urban planning methods. London, UK: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
Brooks-Gunn, J., Duncan, G.J., Klebanov, P.K., and Sealand, N. 1993. Do neighborhoods
influence child and adolescent development? American Journal of Sociology, 99:353395.
Chapin, F.S. 1940. An experiment on the social effects of good housing. American Sociological
Review, 6:868-879.
Clampett-Lundquist, S. 2003. Finding and keeping affordable housing: Analyzing the
experiences of single-mother families in north Philadelphia. Journal of Sociology and
Social Welfare, 30:123-140.
Clay, P.L. 1979. Neighborhood renewal. New York: D.C. Heath and Company.
Colton, K. 2003. Housing in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Crane, J. 1991. The epidemic theory of ghettos and neighborhood effects on dropping out and
teenage childbearing. American Journal of Sociology, 96:1226-1259.
Fried, M. 1963. Grieving for a lost home. In The Urban Condition, L.J. Duhl (ed.) New York:
94

Basic Books.
Fullilove, M.T. 2004. Root shock: How tearing up city neighborhoods hurts America, and what
we can do about it. New York: Random House.
Gale, D.E. 1984. Neighborhood revitalization and the postindustrial city: A multinational
perspective. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
1986. Demographic research on gentrification and displacement. Journal of Planning
Literature, 1:14-29.
Galster, G.C., Tatian, P.A., Santiago, A.M., Pettit, K.L.S., and Smith, R.E. 2003. Why not in my
backyard? : Neighborhood impacts of deconcentrating assisted housing. New
Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research.
Galster, G.C. 2005. Consequences from the redistribution of urban poverty during the 1990s: A
cautionary tale. Economic Development Quarterly, 19:119-125.
Gans, H.J. 1973. The failure of urban renewal. In J.Q. Wilson (ed.) Urban renewal: The
record and controversy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Goetz, E.G. 2002. Forced relocation vs. voluntary mobility: The effects of dispersal programmes
on households. Housing Studies, 17:107-123.
Goetz, E.G. 2003. Housing dispersal programs. Journal of Planning Literature, 18, 3-16.
Gotham, K.F. and Wright, J.D. 1999. Housing policy. In Handbook of social welfare policy. (J.
Midgley, M. Tracy, and M. Livermore (Eds.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Green, S.B. and N.J. Salkind. 2005. Using SPSS for Windows and Macintosh: Analyzing
and understanding data. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.
Heumann, L.F. 1998. Assisted living in public housing. In D. P. Varady, W. F. E. Preiser and F.
P. Russell, (Eds.) New directions in urban public housing. New Brunswick, NJ: Center
95

for Urban Policy Research Books.
Hirsch, A.R. 1983. Making the second ghetto: Race and housing in Chicago, 1940-1960.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Jencks, C. 1992. Rethinking social policy: Race, poverty, and the underclass. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Johnstone, J. 1978. Social class, social areas, and delinquency. Sociology and Social Research,
63:49-72.
Keating, D.W. 1998. Displacement. pp. 121-123 in The encyclopedia of housing. W. Van Vliet
(Ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Keating, L. 2000. Redeveloping public housing: Relearning urban renewal’s immutable lessons.
Journal of the American Planning Association, 66:384-397.
Kingsley, G.T., Johnson, J., and Pettit, K.L.S. 2003. Patterns of Section 8 relocation in the HOPE
VI program. Journal of Urban Affairs, 25:427-447.
Kleit, R.G. 2001. Neighborhood relations in suburban scattered-site and clustered public
housing. Journal of Urban Affairs, 23:409-430.
Main, T.J. 1996. Analyzing evidence for the structural theory of homelessness. Journal of Urban
Affairs, 18:449-457.
Massey, D.S., and Denton, N. 1993. American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the
underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McKay, R. 2004. Building begins in Parramore. Orlando Sentinel, December 8, 2004. Page B1.
McKay, R. 2005. Parramore blueprint unveiled. Orlando Sentinel, June 15, 2005. Page B1.
National Housing Association. 1920. Housing problems in America: Proceedings of the eighth
national conference on housing. New York, NY: National Housing Association.
96

Newman, O. 1972. Defensible space. New York: The Macmillan Company.
Newman, S.J. and Owen, M.S. 1983. Residential displacement: Extent, nature and effects.
Journal of Social Issues, 38:135-148.
Nguyen, M.T. 2005. Does affordable housing detrimentally affect property values? A review of
the literature. Journal of Planning Literature, 20:15-26.
Orlando Housing Authority. 2006. “OHA’s New Carver Park.” Web page accessed 14 January,
2006 at www.orl-oha.org/Carver_Park_Update.htm
Pagano, M.A. and Bowman, A.O’M. 1995. Cityscapes and capital: The politics of urban
development. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Quillian, L. and Pager, D. 2001. Black neighbors, higher crime? The role of racial stereotypes in
evaluations of neighborhood crime. American Journal of Sociology, 107:717-767.
Rainwater, L. 1966. Fear and the house-as-haven in the lower class. Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, 32:23-31.
Rainwater, L. 1970. Behind ghetto walls: Black families in a federal slum. Chicago, IL: Aldine
Publishing Company.
Rubin, B.A., Wright, J.D., and Devine, J.A. 1992. Unhousing the urban poor: The Reagan
legacy. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 19:111-147.
Schill, M.H. and Nathan. 1983. Revitalizing America’s cities: Neighborhood reinvestment and
displacement. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Schlueb, M. 2006. Tainted soil halts Orlando housing project. Orlando Sentinel, February 15,
2006. Page B1.
Shlay, A. and Rossi, P. 1992. Social science research and contemporary studies of homelessness.
Annual Review of Sociology, 18:129-160.
97

Sampson, R.J., and Raudenbush, S.W. 2004. Seeing disorder: Neighborhood stigma and the
social construction of “broken windows”. Social Psychology Quarterly, 67:319-342.
Short, J.L. 1966. Relocation: A myth or reality? Urban Affairs Quarterly, 2:62-74.
Spence, L.H. 1993. Rethinking the social role of public housing. Housing Policy Debate, 4:355368.
Stone, M. 1993. Shelter poverty: New ideas on housing affordability. Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press.
Turk, M. 2004. The question of rent: The emerging urban housing crisis in the new century.
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28:909-918.
Urban Institute and Abt Associates. 2002. The HOPE VI resident tracking study: A snapshot of
the current living situation of original residents from eight sites.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1997. Public housing: Status of the HOPE VI demonstration
program. GAO-97-44.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1998. HOPE VI: Progress and problems in revitalizing
distressed public housing. GAO-98-187.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 2003. Public housing: HUD’s oversight of HOPE VI sites
needs to be more consistent. GAO-03-555.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 2004. Public housing: HOPE VI resident issues and changes in
neighborhoods surrounding grant sites. GAO-04-109.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1981. Residential displacement – An
update. Washington D.C.: HUD.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2006. About HOPE VI. Web page

98

accessed 17 February, 2006
www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/index.cfm.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2006. Housing choice voucher fact sheet.
Web page accessed 22 February, 2006
www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet.cfm
Vale, L.J. 1995. The imaging of the city: Public housing and communication. Communication
Research, 22:646-663.
Vale, L.J. 2002. Reclaiming public housing: A half century of struggle in three public
neighborhoods. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Watson, W.H. 1980. Stress and old age: A case study of black aging and transplantation shock.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, Inc.
Watt, M.L. 2003. Keep HOPE VI alive. Journal of Housing and Community Development,
September/October: 6-7.
Wilson, W.J. 1987. The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Wright, J.D., Rubin, B.A., and Devine, J.A. 1998. Beside the golden door: Policy, politics, and
the homeless. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
Wright, J.D., and Lam, J.A. 1987. Homelessness and the low-income housing supply. Social
Policy, Spring, 48-53.
Wright, J.D. 1989. Address unknown: The homeless in America. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de
Gruyter.

99

